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Abstract 
 
Objectives: To explore some of the key assumptions underpinning the continued 
development of general practitioner-led commissioning in health services. 
 
Methods: Qualitative data from two studies of service improvement in the English 
NHS were considered against the UK¶VUHFHQWPRYHVWRZDUGV*3-led 
commissioning. These data were collected through in-depth interviews with a total of 
187 professionals and 99 people affected by services in 10 different primary care 
trust areas across England between 2008 and 2009. 
 
Results: Internationally, GPs are seen to have a central position in health systems. 
In keeping with this, the UK pROLF\SODFHVHPSKDVLVRQWKHµSLYRWDOUROH¶RIgeneral 
practitioners, considered to be ideally placed to commission in the best interests of 
their patients. However, our evidence suggests that general practitioners do not 
always have a pivotal role for all patients.  Moreover, commissioning groups in 
England will not be subject to top-down performance management and this raises the 
question of how we can be sure that agreed quality standards will be met under the 
new system. 
Conclusions: This paper questions the assumption that GPs are best placed to 
commission health services in a way that meets quality standards and leads to 
equitable outcomes. There is little evidence to suggest that GPs will succeed where 
others have failed and a risk that, without top down performance management, 
service improvement will be patchy, leading to greater, not reduced, inequity.      
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4 
Introduction 
In 2010 the UK government published its White PDSHUµEquity and Excellence: 
Liberating the NHS¶1 outlining an intention WRIUHHWKH1+6IURPµexcessive 
bureaucratic and political control¶S.9). One of the most radical proposals put forward 
was to abolish primary care trusts (PCTs), the bodies currently responsible for 
commissioning the bulk of English health services, and shift this responsibility to 
groups of general practitioners (GPs).  
 
The proposed policies reflect an internationally held DVSLUDWLRQWRµWLSWKHEDODQFH¶ of 
health systems towards primary care.2 (p.17), 3 However, they were met with 
unprecedented resistance and, after an independent review, substantive revisions 
have been put forward.4 Much of the disquiet centred on the potential for the reforms 
to open the doors to the private healthcare industry, but there was also concern that 
giving so much decision making power to GPs was untested, and coupling this with 
the abolition of existing structures risked compromising accountability and equity.   
 
Using evidence from two research projects looking at service improvement in the 
English NHS (one evaluating the implementation of the National Service Framework 
for Long Term Neurological Conditions,5 the other the provision of care closer to 
home for children and young people6) this paper explores some of the reasons why 
commissioners had limited success in effecting major change in these areas and 
questions the assumption that GPs, by nature of their position as primary care 
clinicians, are better placed to commission health services. 
5 
Disempowering the hierarchy 
The stated intention of the reforms announced in 2010 was WRµdisempower the 
hierarchy¶7 and shift power into the hands of clinicians and patients. In the vision 
outlined in the original health White Paper, PCTs would be abolished and groups of 
GP practices (now clinical commissioning groups,4 or CCGs) would take on 
responsibility for most commissioning. A single NHS Commissioning Board would 
provide leadership but local consortia would be entrusted with agreeing their own 
priorities. The existing performance management system of top-down targets would 
be replaced with a new NHS Outcomes Framework, the first of which was published 
in December 2010. Rather than the Department of Health specifying how those 
outcomes should be delivered, National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE) quality standards would be used to develop commissioning guidance for 
CCGs.  
 
Taken at face value these proposals appeared to signify a clear intention to take a 
hands-off approach to health service performance management. The feasibility of 
such a move has since, however, come into question, not least because it would rely 
on the strength and skills of CCGs to implement best practice with no recourse to 
national targets. This was highlighted in a recent Kings Fund report:  
 
« how far providers will be accountable for delivering a good or excellent 
service will depend heavily on the role played by commissioners (through 
contracts), whose effectiveness is likely to vary considerably at a local 
level.8 
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Influencing providers is an area where PCTs themselves have struggled.9, 10, 11 
Areas where they had most influence under the previous system tended to be 
those backed by government targets.10, 11 In particular, the acute sector waiting 
time targets introduced from 2001 have had unprecedented success.12, 13, 14 
This might suggest that, while commissioners have found themselves relatively 
powerless to influence some patterns of service delivery, they have been more 
successful where policy is supported by national process targets.  
  
Despite their success, top-down targets have been unpopular. Specifically, they can 
OHDGWRµJDPLQJ¶ZKHUHGDWDDUHPDQLSXODWHGRUV\VWHPVDGDSWHGWRPHHWWDUJHWV
without achieving underlying aims.15 However, some commentators argue that 
µGaming does not mean that we ought to reject targets but rather that they are being 
WDNHQVHULRXVO\¶.16 (p.3130) Moreover, research suggests that, in contrast to targets, non-
mandatory guidance is not always taken seriously by those involved in implementing 
it.17 A shift towards the use of commissioning guidance and away from mandatory 
targets may therefore be risky. Local CCGs will be entrusted with ensuring that 
providers meet high standards and implement improvements, thus relying heavily on 
the competency and influence of these groups.  
 
GP led commissioning 
Doctor-led commissioning is not a new idea, nor is it one that is confined to the UK. 
In the USA, some doctor-led groups have held budgets for primary and secondary 
care since the mid-1980s,18 and in the UK, the NHS µSXUFKDVHUDQGSURYLGHUVSOLW¶
(which created the possibility that GPs could hold their own budgets) was first 
announced in 1989.19 µ7RWDOSXUFKDVLQJ¶SLORWV followed in the 1990, with fundholding 
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practices invited to take responsibility for, potentially, all health services for their 
patients,20  and in 2005 practice-based commissioning (PBC) was introduced.21 
However, evaluation of the total purchasing pilots drew no definite conclusions as to 
whether GP commissioning was the best way to improve health services22 and 
studies of PBC have been similarly equivocal.23, 24 The Health Reform Evaluation 
Programme concluded that the impact of PBC had so far been minimal10 and a study 
by Coleman et al. found that, while there was positive engagement with PBC 
DPRQJVWDFRPPLWWHGFRUHRI*3µactivists¶Dnumber of barriers to their ability to 
influence demand and make cost savings remained.25 A recent review found 
evidence for both benefits and negative impacts of GP led commissioning.26 It could 
be argued, therefore, that this latest proposal to put GPs at the helm of 
commissioning is, like those before it, µgrounded more on the expectation that GPs 
should be able to bring about change, given their pivotal role in the system, than on 
firm evidence that they invariably do so¶.22 (p.256) But what evidence is there that GPs 
actually play this µSLYRWDOUROH¶IRUDOOSDWLHQWV"  
 
Calnan et al. explain that, in countries like Denmark, the Netherlands and the UK, 
*3VDUHVHHQWRKDYHDFHQWUDOSRVLWLRQLQWKHKHDOWKV\VWHPDVµJDWHNHHSHUV¶ZLWK
the dual role both of rationing the use of expensive specialist services and of guiding 
people through the health system, monitoring and coordinating their progress in order 
to maintain and improve quality.27 In fact, GPs are not the only professionals 
µJDWHNHHSLQJ¶Vpecialist services. In their study of the impact of PBC, Coleman et al. 
explained: 
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$VLJQLILFDQWSURSRUWLRQRIUHIHUUDOVDUHµFRQVXOWDQW-to-FRQVXOWDQW¶UHIHUUDOV
within hospitals (in one of our study sites this amounted to nearly 60% of 
new referrals), and whilst PBC consortia can make representations about 
this, we found that it was an area in which it was difficult to make an 
impact.25  
(p.31) 
 
The extent to which GPs fulfil the latter role, of guiding people through the system 
once they are in it, has also been questioned. A recent study found a lack of 
ownership amongst UK primary care teams of some conditions (such as dementia, 
multiple morbidities and mental health problems) and recommended GPs take a 
more proactive approach to care management.28 The two studies drawn upon in this 
paper shed further light on GPs¶UROHVin care coordination, and on the barriers and 
facilitators to health service improvement in two different service areas: long-term 
neurological conditions (LTNCs), DQGFKLOGUHQ¶VKHDOWKFDUHµFORVHUWRKRPH¶ (CCTH).5, 
6
 
 
 
Methods 
Both studies were funded by the National Institute for Health Research Service 
Delivery and Organisation programme and undertaken by [details removed] between 
2006 and 2010. One was an evaluation of the implementation of the National Service 
Framework (NSF) for Long-Term Neurological Conditions;29 the other a study of 
health care delivered µcloser to home¶ for children with a range of conditions, 
recommended in Standard 6 of the NSF for Children, Young People and Maternity 
Services.30 Both were multi-methods studies including case studies of service 
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systems. PCT case study areas were purposively selected to give a range of 
demographic, geographic and service characteristics and primary data were 
collected through qualitative interviews. For the LTNCs study, we interviewed 151 
professionals and 71 people with LTNCs across six PCT areas. For the CCTH study 
we interviewed 36 professionals and 28 parents (including one extended family 
member)  of children receiving CCTH (i.e. services that prevent hospital admission or 
reduce length of stay) across four PCTs. This paper, therefore, draws on data 
obtained through in-depth interviews with a total of 187 professionals and 99 people 
affected by services in 10 different PCT areas across England. 
 
More details of our samples and approach to recruitment can be found in the full 
published reports.5, 6 In brief, professionals in relevant organisations (health, social 
care or voluntary) were approached to take part in telephone interviews and a 
µVQRZEDOO¶PHWKRGXVHGWRLGHQWLI\IXUWKHUUHOHYDQWVWDNHKROGHUVXQWLOGDWDVDWXUDWLRQ
was reached. A number of these organisations then invited people with neurological 
conditions (for the LTNCs project) and parents of children receiving CCTH (for the 
CCTH project) to take part in face-to-face interviews. Responses to these invitations 
came directly to the research team. Interviews were semi-structured, guided by a list 
of topics, audio recorded and transcribed. Data were then analysed thematically 
using the Framework approach, whereby text is summarised into a matrix arranged 
by categories and participants.31 Ethical approval for both studies was granted via the 
National Research Ethics Service and informed consent given by all participants.  
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Results 
In the first part of this section, we explore some of the reasons why PCTs had limited 
success in effecting major change in both the implementation of the NSF for LTNCs 
and paediatric CCTH, and consider the implications of this for future commissioners. 
We then turn to the interviews with patients and parents to explore some of the 
assumptions underpinning the argument for GP-led commissioning. 
 
Light touch guidance is µnot a priority¶   
The evidence from both studies supports the argument that PCTs were not powerful 
enough to implement guidance or substantially change patterns of service provision 
without the support of performance managed targets. In both cases, the policy 
recommendations under study had little impact. The professionals we spoke to 
attributed this in large part to the relatively low priority ascriEHGWRWKHVHµOLJKWWRXFK¶
National Service Frameworks, and the inability of those tasked with leading reforms to 
rally support for them. The NSF for LTNCs set out optimum quality standards across 
health and social care and required PCTs to lead locally on their implementation. 
These standards, termed Quality Requirements (QRs), were all evidence-based and 
widely supported by specialist voluntary sector and patient groups. However, no 
system of performance management accompanied the framework and there was no 
clear guidance on how achievement of the QRs should be measured. The aspirational 
wording of the document, which specified outcomes such as, µ$SHUVRQ-centred 
VHUYLFH¶45OHGstaff interviewed to describe it DVµwoolly¶µvague¶DQG µjust not 
practical¶. Comparisons were made between the LTNCs agenda and other policies 
and targets that were felt to have more force. As one manager explained: 
 
11 
I have to say, in the scheme of things, this is not a priority. There are no 
national targets against this. We've got, we are absolutely flat out trying to 
get the cancer targets sorted out, the rapid access chest pain clinics, the 
sexual health attendance targets, the 18 week target, and frankly, if it 
hasn't got a target, we haven't got the time to do it. 
(Acute Trust Manager) 
 
The 16)¶VODFNRIWDUJHWVPDGHNH\VWDIIPHPEHUVUHOXFWDQWWRJLYHXSWKHLUWLPHWR
attend meetings and prioritise action. Interviewees pointed out that, while targets are 
unpopular, they are also the incentives that drive their organisations. Without strong 
performance management there was nothing to compel PCTs, local authorities or 
acute trusts to improve services:  
 
«WKHUHDVRQZH¶UHVWLOOKHUHWDONLQJDERXWLWIRXU\HDUVOater is because 
WKHUHZHUHQRWDUJHWV$QGDOWKRXJKSHRSOHVD\WKDWZHGRQ¶WOLNHWDUJHWV
DQGZHGRQ¶WOLNHOLVWVEXWWREHKRQHVWLIWKHUH¶VQR WDUJHWVLW¶VQRWRQWKH
H[HFV¶± LW¶VQRWRQWKHH[HFGLUHFWRUV¶UDGDU 
(PCT Commissioner) 
 
We are well aware [that the NSF] GRHVQ¶WFRPHZLWKDQ\SHQDOWLHVIRUQRQ-
FRPSOLDQFHRUUHZDUGVIRUWKH7UXVWLQDFKLHYLQJLW«0DQDJHPHQWNQRZ
DERXWWKH16)EXWLW¶VZD\GRZQWKHLUOLVWEHFDXVHWKHUHDUHQRLQFHQWLYHV
or penalties to do anything about it. 
(Acute Trust Clinician) 
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In each area a single PCT officer or small group was tasked with implementing the 
NSF as part of a wider portfolio of work, but all struggled to encourage key 
professionals, both within their own organisations and beyond, to engage in the 
process. It was not uncommon for local implementation teams to have little or no 
involvement from senior strategic health or social care staff with the authority to 
agree and support developments, meaning plans for implementation could not be 
taken forward.  
 
In contrast, objectives underpinned by targets and financial incentives for the Long 
Term Conditions Programme, a similar sounding but actually quite distinct area of 
service improvement, did see results. The priorities for this agenda were backed by a 
Public Service Agreement (a nationally set target) to reduce hospital emergency bed 
days by five per cent in three years32 and there was a clear financial incentive for 
commissioners to do this, as under Payment by Results each emergency bed day 
came with a price tag for the PCT. The Department of Health surpassed its target in 
2008, achieving a reduction in emergency bed days of 13 per cent,33, 34 whereas the 
impact of the LTNCs NSF was patchy and limited.5  
 
The National Service Framework for Children was another µOLJKWWRXFK¶16)VHWWLQJ
EHVWSUDFWLFHJXLGHOLQHVIRUFKLOGUHQ¶VVHUYLFHVLQFOXGLQJ6WDQGDUGZKLFK
emphasised the need to provide health care closer to home. Despite its different 
focus, professionals cited similar barriers to implementation in this policy area. A 
consultant paediatrician summed up the problem as follows:  
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,WKLQNLWKDVKDGVRPHLPSDFWEXWLW¶VSUHWW\OLPLWHGUHDOO\$QGWKHPDLQ
UHDVRQ,VD\WKDWLVEHFDXVHZKHQWKDWZDVLQWURGXFHGLWGLGQ¶WKDYH
specific targets which, which would have driven some outcomes. For 
example, if there had been a target in the National Service Framework that 
any child that needed speech and language therapy should be seen within 
twelve weeks and that was, there was financial penalties to organisations 
for not providing that, then there would have been, that would have 
resulted in real change. But the National Service Framework is a very 
good document describing some very good aims for, for, for improvement 
RIFKLOGKHDOWKFDUHEXWLWZDVQ¶WEDFNHGXSZLWKany specific penalties or 
incentives for doing it. 
(Acute Trust Clinician) 
 
The absence of performance management mechanisms or financial incentives was 
similarly seen by commissioners as the major block to this agenda: 
 
6RLW¶VDELWRID³\HVLWZRXOGEH QLFHWRZRXOGQ¶WLW´NLQGRIDSSURDch « 
EXWLI\RXGRQ¶WGRLWLVDQ\ERG\JRLQJWRJHWVDFNHGSUREDEO\QRW. 
(PCT Commissioner) 
 
In both studies, GPs reportedly played only a marginal role in the implementation of 
the guidance in question. Certainly, there appeared to be very little GP interest in 
implementing the NSF for LTNCs via practice-based commissioning, although this 
was still in its fledgling stages at the time of our fieldwork. In the CCTH study, there 
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was evidence that some GPs were actively resisting changing patterns of service 
provision:  
 
« VRPHGLGQ¶WHYHQWKLQNWRXVH[the care closer to home service] at all, 
and some of that was about GPs, I suppose, perhaps, perhaps we had 
some GPs saying, you know, if I think this child needs referring in [to 
hospital] WKHQWKDW¶VZKHUHWKH\¶UHJRLQJ « 
(PCT (Provider Services) Clinician) 
 
This was in direct opposition to the national policy aspiration to deliver more care 
outside RIKRVSLWDODQGDJDLQUDLVHVWKHTXHVWLRQRI*3V¶UROHLQDFKLHYLQJQDWLRQal 
priorities (or setting their own). For GPs to have legitimacy in setting priorities for their 
local populations, they must understand the needs of that population and be 
motivated to meet them. The above evidence suggests that current commissioners 
and providers can lack this motivation. The rationale behind giving GPs 
commissioning responsibility is the assumption that they are closest to the patient, 
having a better understanding of their needs and thus greater motivation to meet 
these needs without the push of mandatory targets. Evidence from our interviews 
with service users, however, would suggest GPs are not always in this position.  
 
GPs do not always have a pivotal role in care coordination 
Our study of services for people with LTNCs found that GPs were usually only 
marginally involved in the management of this group. While sometimes highly valued 
and often instrumental in the initial recognition of illness and referral for diagnosis, 
*3V¶ involvement tended to tail off once people accessed more specialised care and 
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it was unusual for them to take an active role in care coordination. A number of the 
people we interviewed felt that they themselves, or their (informal) carers, were the 
only people with an overview of their care. Where care coordination was 
professionally managed, this was usually the job of a specialist team or nurse (not 
affiliated with a general practice). GPs were not, therefore, µLQWKHGULYLQJVHDW¶RI
these SDWLHQWV¶RQJRLQJFDUH 
 
The general view from those we interviewed was that this was not a failing of the 
primary care system itself; rather it was a reflection of the generalist role of GPs, who 
were not expected to have the specialist knowledge necessary to manage LTNCs: 
 
,WKLQNLW¶VRne of those illnesses a lot of doctors GRQ¶WNQRZDORWDERXWLW
anyway. « $QGLW¶VQRWOLNHIOXRUDQ\WKLQJ\RXNQRZWKHVWXIIWKDWFRPHV
up regular, you know what I mean?  
(Man with brain injury after Encephalitis) 
 
Interviewer: And what about your GP, do you regularly see «" 
 
Not about the MS. 
 
Interviewer: Right. Do you ever see the «" 
 
Not about the MS, no. %HFDXVH\RXNQRZµFDXVHLW¶VVXFKDVSHFLDOLVW
WKLQJOLNHZLWKDQ\RWKHUFRQGLWLRQ,VXSSRVHWKH\GRQ¶W\RXNQRZWKH\¶OO
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VD\³2K\RX¶GEHWWHUVSHDNWR\RXUQHXURORJLVW´RU, you know, ³<RX¶G
better speak to your MS nurse.´ 
(Woman with Multiple Sclerosis) 
 
Your GP practice, you just more or less collect your prescription from him 
DQGJRZLWKWKHJHQHUDODFKHVDQGSDLQVEHFDXVHWKH\GRQ¶WNQRZ\RXU
medication and one or two of the doctors there will admit to me that they 
GRQ¶WNQRZZKDWWRGRZLWKPH 
(Woman with 3DUNLQVRQ¶V'isease) 
 
GPs also appear to take a back seat in the ongoing coordination of care for children 
with long-term health conditions. In our CCTH study, we found that parents tended to 
view community FKLOGUHQ¶Vnurses or, failing that, hospital based specialists, as their 
first port of call. GPs¶ roles tended to focus on the initial rationing of services rather 
than the navigation of ongoing care. Again, parents attributed the limited involvement 
of GPs to their lack of specialist expertise:  
 
« ,¶YHEHHQWRWKH*3WKUHHRUIRXUWLPHVZLWK [child] DQGQRUPDOO\LW¶V,
think you better go to the hospital just to, just to make sure.  
(Father of child with genetic disorder) 
 
Father: « I think from >WKH*3¶V@point of view he probably is a little bit 
GHWDFKHGLVQ¶WKH" 
 
Mother: Yeah. 
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Father: Cos it is [hospital] and us and [hospital] and, you know, the 
community team rather than too much of the GP involved. 
(Parents of child with Leukaemia) 
 
It seems that for children with a range of ongoing health conditions, as well for as 
adults with LTNCs, GPs do not always play a pivotal role in their care. 
 
Discussion 
What implications do these findings have for the proposed UK health service reforms, 
and for health service commissioning more broadly? First, there is the question of 
how effectively health needs can be met if best practice standards are not backed by 
targets or incentives for implementation. We have seen through research in two very 
different areas of health care that guidance, without targets or financial incentives, is 
not always seen as a priority by those tasked with implementation. What is there to 
indicate that GPs will be more motivated to ensure the NICE quality standards are 
PHWWKDQWKHLUSUHGHFHVVRUVZHUHWRLPSOHPHQWµOLJKWWRXFK¶16)V"The NHS 
2XWFRPHV)UDPHZRUNVWDWHGWKDWDµTXDOLW\SUHPLXP¶ZRXOGprovide a financial 
incentive for commissioning groups to achieve certain outcomes, but which outcomes 
and how this will work has not yet been agreed.35, 36 
 
The second issue is whether equity will be achieved if CCGs are entrusted with 
setting their own priorities at a local level. GP-led commissioning has produced some 
innovative developments, but success has been patchy.24, 25, 37 Wyke et al. found that 
WRWDOSXUFKDVLQJSLORWVµemerged as selective purchasers, having responsibility for 
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VHUYLFHDUHDVWKH\ZLVKHGWRGHYRWHWKHLUHQHUJLHVWR¶.22 (p.245) Similarly, Curry et al. 
cautioned that GP commissioners may be more interested in pursuing their own areas 
of interest than improving all areas of service delivery: 
 
In other words, evidence exists of a potential for conflict in practice-led 
commissioning between the needs-based priorities of local communities 
with priorities that are based on the observations and preferences of 
individual GPs.24 (p.8) 
 
Local enthusiasm may have the potential to drive improvement, but if local 
HQWKXVLDVWVWKH*3µDFWLYLVWV¶LGHQWLILHGE\&ROPDQ25) drive forward developments in 
their preferred fields is there a risk that other areas in need of improvement may be 
neglected? Mannion identified a number of potential benefits to GP led-
commissioning, but also some limitations including increased inequalities between 
geographical areas. He concludes that: 
  
The absence of prescriptive central guidance concerning the 
implementation and operation of consortia may result in the development of 
a wide variety of local approaches and outcomes, which will need to be 
monitored, and strategies put in place to ensure that the benefits are 
maximized and any deleterious consequences are mitigated.26 (p.13-14) 
 
We have seen that GPs do not always have a pivotal role in care coordination for 
people with ongoing health conditions. Moreover, studies have shown consistently 
that GP commissioners are not good at public and patient involvement. In the total 
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purchasing pilots, *3VVDZWKHPVHOYHVDVµagents for their patients¶without the need 
to actually involve them in decision making.22 (p.245) Similarly, studies of PBC found 
only a limited commitment to public and patient involvement, and only rudimentary 
involvement arrangements in place.24, 25 The recent UK White Paper set out a vision 
which claimed WREHµgenuinely centred on patients and carers¶1 (p.8) but the reforms it 
proposed may actually give power, not to patients, but to a small group of already 
powerful providers. In response to concerns, the government has pledged to ensure 
that patients and carer are efficiently and effectively involved in CCGs, although at 
time of writing precisely how this will be achieved remains unclear. The revised 
proposals also specify that all CCGs must have some representation from secondary 
care. Nevertheless, the broad thrust of policy remains the same and offers continuity 
with previous attempts to put GPs at the helm of health service commissioning. As 
such, the risks identified in this paper remain pertinent.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper questions the assumption that GPs are best placed to commission health 
services in a way that meets quality standards. There is little evidence that GPs will 
succeed where others have failed and a risk that, without top down performance 
management, GP-led commissioning could lead to greater, not reduced, disparity in 
service quality.  
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